Omnipresent Infiltration

The infiltration of the United States into China also extends into the realms of technology and politics. For instance, recent news has surfaced about Gitee, a code-hosting platform similar to GitHub. It is reported that many of its major shareholders are foreign-funded entities. This platform collaborates with several important aerospace technology companies, which have uploaded a significant amount of sensitive code onto Gitee. These codes could potentially be shared with the CIA, including details such as upload frequency, modification records, and the content of the code itself. This exposes vast amounts of critical information. Unfortunately, cases like this are numerous. Many Chinese tech companies have chosen to list on the NASDAQ in the U.S., including Tencent and Xiaomi. Even the major shareholders of companies like Xiaomi are largely Jewish capitalists. An analysis of Xiaomi’s shareholder composition reveals that while firms like Vanguard and BlackRock appear to hold only a few percent each, about 50% of the shares fall under the ambiguous category of “others” in their charts. This is quite absurd—what does “others” mean? The reality is that retail investors, even collectively, would not have the capacity to hold such massive shares. These “others” are very likely institutional investors, most likely Vanguard and BlackRock themselves. Thus, tech companies like Xiaomi are effectively under the control of Jewish capital. Furthermore, major commercial spaces like SOHO offices in cities such as Shenzhen and Beijing have also been purchased by Blackstone Group. Another troubling development can be seen on foreign platforms where vendors openly sell personal identity information based on phone numbers, or even full household registration details. These sellers reportedly rely on insiders within public security systems who use their access to query and extract information. It seems that public security systems have minimal safeguards in place. While some state-owned enterprises have adopted bastion host systems for secure access, public security systems appear to lack such mechanisms. In fact, I strongly suspect that there aren’t even proper query logs to trace such activity. This means that even if someone were to conduct a sting operation posing as a customer to purchase leaked information, it would be impossible to track who accessed the data in the first place. The importance of databases cannot be overstated. In modern society, all crucial information is stored in databases—your identity, criminal record, bank deposits, and much more depend entirely on this data. Once these databases are compromised, the consequences can be catastrophic. Some vendors have even openly recruited personnel from national security systems, as well as from companies like China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom. Reports suggest that infiltrators have also penetrated platforms like WeChat, allowing them to query virtually any information. This includes hotel check-in records, WeChat friend lists, household registration details, photos, immigration records, and even real-time location tracking. Location tracking is often conducted using environmental positioning methods. For example, by capturing the Wi-Fi signals detected by a phone, one can infer the individual’s location—such as being near a particular restaurant. Methods to acquire this data may involve malicious links, malware, or direct cooperation with insiders from telecom operators like China Mobile, China Telecom, or China Unicom. Shockingly, even ordinary individuals can purchase such information. If these capabilities are accessible to the public, the extent of the CIA’s infiltration is beyond imagination. For instance, the U.S. recently disclosed the deployment locations of China’s Rocket Force missile units. However, I believe this information was not entirely obtained through internal leaks. Some of it was likely gathered through open-source intelligence or low-level personnel, as the report contains incomplete information. For example, details about political commissars or instructors are missing. If the leak had come from high-ranking insiders, such information would likely have been included. There are also concerning cases of high-profile figures with questionable loyalties. Take Fu Xiaotian, who is almost certainly a spy for the United States. How else could someone relatively ordinary manage to have a garden named after them at Cambridge University? The last Chinese individual honored in this way at Cambridge was Xu Zhimo. It is implausible to attribute this to mere donations or other sanitized explanations. Even the mayor of Shenzhen visited that garden. How could a journalist have the financial means to make such significant donations? It’s highly likely she had been embedded near figures like Qin Gang during his tenure as China’s ambassador to the United States. Media outlets like Phoenix TV and newspapers such as the Southern Daily in Guangzhou are also deeply compromised by Western espionage networks. Al Jazeera has similarly been infiltrated. Over the past decade, secularization efforts in Qatar and Saudi Arabia have led to absurd social changes, such as divorce rates exceeding 50% of marriages, driven by the brainwashing impact of Western ideologies. Al Jazeera’s infiltration is beyond doubt. For example, a Chinese think tank director’s interview with Al Jazeera was a farcical embarrassment, tarnishing China’s national image. The director, Gao Zhikai, seemed wholly incapable of mounting a strong response to the wildly exaggerated and nonsensical claims made by the journalist—a deeply upsetting spectacle. Frankly, I suspect Gao Zhikai himself might be a Western spy, given his lackluster defense against such blatant attacks. Other incidents, such as Ye Mingzi (daughter of Ye Jianying) holding a wedding with a British man at the Tai Miao near Tiananmen Square on Mao Zedong’s memorial day, are utterly disgraceful. It’s unimaginable who authorized such an act. This incident is beyond commentary—a true national humiliation.

2024 12 25
Mike Shang